4 An operational approach is “a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission.” 5 Specifically, it is the plan of how Hitler and his generals sought to defeat a Western invasion. More specifically, the research remains problematic because it fails to answer basic questions: Did the Germans have a plan in place to defeat an Allied Western invasion? If so, did Hitler and his commanders follow the plan? To put it simply, who lost D-Day? These questions are independent of Allied plans and actions and cover the events leading up to and on the day of the invasion.īy organizing German plans into elements to create a cognitive map or operational approach, historians may better understand the German defeat. 2 The personal feuds and fights over power, especially the one between Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Oberbefehlshaber West (Supreme Commander West, or OB West), and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Army Group B, contributed to the German failure at Normandy. Adolf Hitler micromanaged tactical actions, and given his late wake-up on June 6, the Allies took full advantage. 1 At least superficially, this story fails to go beyond some notable facts. As the story goes, the Allied invasion was so superior and heroic that nothing the Germans did mattered the good guys were bound to win. The Allies, with overwhelming force and an overabundance of courage, executed a brilliant assault plan and won the longest day. This failure is counter to the mythological story of D-Day. The Germans did have a plan, however, and Krancke and Sperrle proved to be the weak links: Both failed to execute when facing an Allied invasion on the Western Front. Infighting, conflicting authorities, and lack of warfighting capabilities clearly hampered German command and control of operations on the Normandy coast. In using structured and qualitative analysis to examine German strategy and operations in the events leading up to and on D-Day, the loss can be traced to Admiral Theodor Krancke, commander of Naval Group West, and Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle, commander of Luftwaffe Third Air Fleet. Sixty-four years after Moltke’s observation, two mid-level German commanders, faced with the herculean task of changing the course of history on an early June 1944 morning, failed in their duties. Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke the Elder
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